Apprentice to the Work of Thinking: Essays on Violence, Fear, Freedom, Hope by Moloney, Annie
Masthead Logo Scholar Works
Honors Theses Honors
2019
Apprentice to the Work of Thinking: Essays on
Violence, Fear, Freedom, Hope
Annie Moloney
University of Maine at Farmington
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umf.maine.edu/honors_theses
Part of the Nonfiction Commons
This Research Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors at Scholar Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses
by an authorized administrator of Scholar Works. For more information, please contact sotley@maine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Moloney, Annie, "Apprentice to the Work of Thinking: Essays on Violence, Fear, Freedom, Hope" (2019). Honors Theses. 2.
https://scholarworks.umf.maine.edu/honors_theses/2







Apprentice to the Work of Thinking: 








Faculty Sponsors:  
Dr. Éireann Lorsung 







Prelude: To Touch One Another 
 
When I was a child, my sister and I weren’t allowed to touch each other. My mother 
made this rule for us early on, and it was one we usually followed with little trouble. I can 
remember telling someone once that nobody had ever intentionally hit me before, which is 
something I have believed for most of my life. It was only recently, when violence became 
something I had an immediate and urgent desire to understand, that I realized that this story was 
untrue.  
The morning after finding out that my college boyfriend had cheated on me, I sat in the 
office of a beloved professor weeping.  
“It just feels like,” I kept repeating over and over, unable to finish the sentence.  
“Like someone punched you in the face,” my professor said, with the kind of sincere 
assuredness that made me feel like she wasn’t falling back on a platitude. After the daze of 
confusion and shock that I had been in the night before, when I had received news of the betrayal 
in my dark dorm room via social media, the bright light of the office and the reality of my 
professor’s concerned gaze was the first moment that the weight of the situation truly struck me. 
The confusion I felt in that moment was something I had only experienced once or twice before 
in my life. It was the same kind of confusion that I have come to associate with acts of physical 
violence. 
I realized later how I knew this. I was maybe thirteen years old, standing in the bedroom 
that my sister and I shared. My sister’s mouth hung open and her eyes were stunned, then 
transfixed on me. We had been arguing over who the actual owner of a certain tube of lipgloss 
was. Completely sure that it belonged to me, I threatened to divulge a secret my sister had been 
keeping from my parents if she didn’t relinquish the gloss to me immediately. Convinced that the 
gloss was rightfully hers, and that she would not be forced to bend to blackmail, my sister 
abandoned reason, reached out with both her hands, and pushed me hard enough that I stumbled 
backward. In the seconds following, we were both motionless. I stared back at my sister in 
similar slack-jawed silence, unable to compute what might happen next. The act was 
incomprehensible. It defied the private rules we had been living within the bounds of for our 
entire sisterhood; not just my mother’s rule that told us not to touch each other without 
permission, but our rules of how we waged war on one another.  
My sister had stepped across an invisible boundary and I didn’t know how to respond. I 
knew she would be in trouble for hitting me, but in that moment I wasn’t thinking about tattling 
on her.  I never even told my mother about it. I realized in that moment that  the use of physical 
violence was a possible line to cross—one that ​had​ been crossed—and that realization was 
enough to make me never want to think about the incident again. For the next eight years, I 
essentially buried this memory.  
In college, when I made the discovery that a person I loved and trusted had betrayed me, 
I had the same feeling of raw shock I had felt when my sister pushed me. It was the feeling of 
being suddenly pulled outside of a code I had believed was unwavering. My understanding of 
what was true and possible shifted; my genuine predisposition to trust people began to come 
unglued. I began to question whether my boyfriend’s betrayal was my own fault for not having 
known any better.  
It is the boundary between blind trust in moral codes and the ease with which we cross 
into disregard for them that makes violence such a confusing territory. I don’t walk through my 
day-to-day life expecting to get punched in the face, literally or metaphorically; if I did, it would 
call both my personal security and health into question. It would be a deep cause for concern. 
Abuse is never okay. Violence is never the answer.​ (We have heard all of the sayings.) 
But what happens when we call violence and abuse by other names? Names like duty, 
sacrifice, and honor? Violence wounds us in one way when we are not expecting it. It wounds us 
in entirely different ways when we know what is coming, but wait for it to come anyway. This 
has been something I have struggled to understand, and simultaneously have been victim to. I 
struggle to find words to talk about the kinds of violence that permeate the world I live in. I live 
in a world that accepts violence. Until recently, I never attempted to understand what this meant. 
I never asked myself what the differences between protection and violence are. Lately, I have 
been trying to understand where these terms intersect. What happens when two things so 
opposed—​to harm​ and ​to protect​—are fused together? This contrast, this clash, this incongruity 
has become, in recent years, a source of great moral turmoil in my life.  
I have attempted at various points to unpack and repack this moral problem around the 
intersection of harm and protection. It is something I am still trying to understand. Much of this 
thinking took place as I tried to reconcile my pacifist upbringing with my boyfriend’s military 
career (which is the primary subject of the third part of this essay). The more time I have spent 
thinking about the military, the more I have uncovered ways in which the structure of that system 
frames our understanding of what constitutes an ethical action. The unwritten laws of patriotism, 
central myths of the U.S. military, tell us that loyalty to our country, and loyalty to the cause of 
freedom for our fellow citizens is—fundamentally—an act of protection. This loyalty is an act of 
care, or heroism; of upstanding moral character. Care, heroism, uprightness: these are values we 
stand behind as we send our soldiers into battle. But ​battle​ is not an alternate moral universe. 
Battle​ happens in the same universe where I live, the one where I have been taught to understand 
that killing is wrong, that violence against a fellow human being is extremely difficult to justify 
by circumstance. And soldiers are citizens, like I am. 
What I have begun to uncover and reckon with in my own life is that the military is just 
one system that frames how we understand what violence can mean. There are other systems 
constantly at play in my life, like my gender identity, race, and class, that dictate how violence 
touches me, and in what ways I access it. How can I understand violence if I am unable to see the 
factors at play in my life which are acting on me?  
For a very long time, I never questioned whether it was right or wrong for a soldier to kill 
another person, because I did not think this was something I was allowed to question. But even 
more than that, I sensed that even if I might have liked to ask such a question, nothing was 
forcing​ me to understand. I was safe inside my subject position. But I sensed that maybe my 
subject position did not protect me in every regard. After all, my sister had pushed me; she broke 
the rule against touching in our house. My question, then, became about understanding the power 
structures behind individual acts of violence. What has transformed the way I experience and 
understand violence? What factors are acting on people in other subject positions which I have 









I. Two Considerations of Fear 
 
When I was in middle school I suffered from severe anxiety. For a period of time when I 
was in seventh grade I was bullied by a boy I had known for several years, with whom I shared 
only one class. I did not have much contact with him during the day, but when I did see him I 
was usually alone.  
In the hallway on my way to the bathroom, I turn a corner and his face is close to mine, 
his taunting voice in my ear, ​where are you going, Annie?​ In art class, I am at the sink mixing 
paper mache paste and I hear snickering. I redden, not turning my head to look because I know 
he is behind me. ​What’s in that bucket Annie? Did you puke?​ I am standing at my locker, and I 
see him coming towards me staring but he says nothing. He passes. ​Fuck you Annie, ​under his 
breath.  
In elementary school, I had gotten this boy in trouble for throwing a basketball in girls’ 
faces to scare them. When I spoke up about it, I trusted that my teacher would stop his behavior 
from harming anyone in the future. I didn’t understand the nature of harm then. I viewed it 
innocently. I trusted that there was a system in place that would protect me. Telling my teacher 
would ensure the basketball would be removed from the classroom, and the boy would no longer 
be able to cause me or other girls harm.  
Over the next several years, we were in different classrooms and had little contact. But he 
never forgot how easy it had been for me to speak up against him, and as he got older, he found 
ways of harming me that I could not speak about. After his private verbal abuse got particularly 
bad, I remember confiding in my sister. I was in the shower one evening, thinking about an 
incident at school that day, and suddenly I felt as if I would be sick. I got out of the shower, 
wrapped my towel around me and sat on the bathroom floor crying. My sister heard me and burst 
in to see what was going on. When I told her about what had happened at school that day, and 
that it had been happening for some time, she shrugged and told me that boys sometimes make 
fun of girls they like. Standing in the shower, reflecting on his words was panic-inducing, but as 
soon as my sister left, my wet, shaking body on the floor of the bathroom began to feel 
melodramatic, maybe even shameful.  
I didn’t speak about it to anyone else for a long time. I had friends at school who cared 
for me and they didn’t know. I did well in school. I didn’t even see this boy every day. I 
convinced myself I was okay. On the way to school in the morning I would curl up into a ball in 
my seat alone on the school bus pretending to listen to music on my iPod, but what I was really 
listening to were recordings I had made of myself saying things like ​you’re safe at school, 
everything is fine, he doesn’t matter, they are just words, they are just words, they are just 
words.​ It was not enough to think these things; I had to actually ​hear​ myself saying them. 
Eventually, the boy moved away. But here again my understanding of the pervasiveness of harm 
was wrong. I had thought distance would bring safety, but the boy’s words still found me in 
private Facebook messages. ​Hey bitch, did you think I was gone? I will find you. I have a gun 
and I will find you wherever you go.  
There can be a disconnect between a ​sense​ for right and wrong and one’s ​actions​. When I 
have tried to understand this in the past, I have been asking myself the wrong question. My 
question used to be, ​is violence rational? ​After a certain point, the question became less about 
trying to understand what constitutes a violation of our moral code, and more a question of how I 
rationalize a breach in this code.  Is there really any gray area when it comes to acts of violence?  
How does a person get to a place in which the confiscation of a basketball is 
proportionate to a threat of death? Something about how this boy was socialized taught him to 
believe that, or made that belief pass in his own narrative. It wasn’t until years after he threw the 
basketball in my face that I even questioned what was actually happening. For many years, I just 
tried to forget what had happened. It was my brain’s way of trying, not just to survive, but to 
live. But now I ask myself: what was happening in his mind? In mine? In the minds of those who 
narrate and decode for children the systems of protection that are in place for them?  
Years after the situation had been resolved, I was home from college on Thanksgiving 
break and I went upstairs to look for my passport in the file cabinet my parents keep in their 
bedroom. Inside this cabinet is my father’s record of everything. Folder after folder was labeled 
in his neat dark pencil script with all the things I expected to see: ​Annie’s taxes, Cindy’s benefits 
information, UMF tuition payment plan, family history notes from Mam, Car payments. ​And 
then there was one I didn’t expect: ​Annie’s court case. ​There was something unsettling about 
seeing a record of an event that had slipped through the crevasses of my life.​ Of course​ my father 
had kept a record of it. He had kept copies of the protection order, notes from the police, 
information from the court, and screenshots of the social media messages before they were 
removed from my inbox, before the boy’s account was somehow erased from my reach for my 
own protection. The records were a reminder that this moment in my life which I had wiped from 
my memory still existed as a collection of material artifacts with its own narrative.  
W​hen this boy threw a basketball in my face, it was with a lack of regard for or 
knowledge of my situation as a girl who was socialized to expect harm. A girl who, through this 
experience and others would develop an understanding of her vulnerability to men. The initial 
act of throwing the basketball in my face was an act committed on the basis that it could be 
committed. Even if the boys had been unable to articulate why they held the power in this 
situation, even if they could not name gender as the leading factor, they could sense my position 
of subordination to them. They sensed that throwing a basketball in my face was an act that they 
could commit against me based on their position of dominance.  
A group of boys blocking a door that a girl is trying to walk through—a group of boys 
among whom one throws an object in that girl’s face—articulate a power structure. On one side 
of the threshold is a single girl trying to exit the room, and on the other are three boys with a 
basketball trying to enter. Because she is alone, and because she has nothing to throw back, the 
three boys can easily scare her into submission and out of their direct path.  
In this narrative, confiscation of basketball could be proportionate to threat of death, 
because this particular boy did not understand the threat he, a boy, posed to me, a girl, and 
because of that he also did not understand why what he did had frightened me enough to tell our 
teacher. He did not have to imagine why I would be frightened. He did not have to understand 
this because he exists inside of a structure of gender domination that gives him power over me as 
a girl. Little boys tell each other that they “run like a girl”, they make fun of expressions of 
emotion by telling each other not to “cry like a girl”. From the beginning of this boy’s life, he 
has been given to understand that girls are inferior to him in some way, even when admitting this 
belief outright is impossible. This structure ​allows​ boys to be ignorant of girls’ experience. It is 
in such spaces of what my teacher calls “imaginative lack” that violence among sane people 
occurs.  
In ​Eichmann in Jerusalem​, Hannah Arendt writes about this kind of gap in a person’s 
capacity to understand and empathize. In her descriptions of Eichmann’s trial and her own 
exploration into his career as a Nazi, she emphasizes how puzzling Eichmann’s sanity proved to 
be for the court. Arendt asks us to consider her titular proposition: “the banality of evil.” That is, 
she asks that we consider the quality that makes evil a possibility for ​anyone​ under the right set 
of circumstances. Arendt writes of the circumstances in Eichmann’s life that led him to the 
courtroom in Jerusalem with so little regard for the acts he had committed. She writes: 
What Eichmann failed to tell the presiding judge in cross-examination was 
that he had been an ambitious young man who was fed up with his job as 
traveling salesman even before the Vacuum Oil Company was fed up with him. 
From a humdrum life without significance and consequence the wind had blown 
him into History, as he understood it, namely, into a Movement that always kept 
moving and in which somebody like him already a failure in the eyes of his social 
class, of his family, and hence in his own eyes as well could start from scratch and 
still make a career. And if he did not always like what he had to do (for example, 
dispatching people to their death by the trainload instead of forcing them to 
emigrate), if he guessed, rather early, that the whole business would come to a 
bad end, with Germany losing the war, if all his most cherished plans came to 
nothing (the evacuation of European Jewry to Madagascar, the establishment of a 
Jewish territory in the Nisko region of Poland, the experiment with carefully built 
defense installations around his Berlin office to repel Russian tanks), and if, to his 
greatest “grief and sorrow,” he never advanced beyond the grade of S.S. 
Obersturmbannführer (a rank equivalent to lieutenant colonel) in short, if, with 
the exception of the year in Vienna, his life was beset with frustrations, he never 
forgot what the alternative would have been. Not only in Argentina, leading the 
unhappy existence of a refugee, but also in the courtroom in Jerusalem, with his 
life as good as forfeited, he might still have preferred if anybody had asked him, 
to be hanged as Obersturmbannführer a.D. (in retirement) rather than living out 
his life quietly and normally as a traveling salesman for the Vacuum Oil 
Company (33-34). 
These were the facts of Eichmann’s life. This was the structure which allowed him, at the end of 
his life, to go to his death unable to show remorse for his actions. That kind of remorse would 
have to be constituted by a kind of imaginative capacity that Eichmann’s situation in life never 
required him to develop.  
 In Eichmann’s case, it was not insanity which led him to make the choices he made, but 
rather his belief in and adherence to systems (German, middle-class, early-20th-century 
masculinity; Naziism) that allowed for his violent acts to exist within the bounds of his 
conscience. His ability to adhere to his position within the Nazi regime came from a lack of 
imagining, or will to imagine, the situation of Jewish people. If Eichmann questioned that what 
he was doing was wrong, he was undoubtedly able to convince himself otherwise; at the least, as 
Arendt suggests, he was able to convince himself that “the alternative” was worse than “what he 
had to do”. It is this state—not of disconnecting, but of never having had to be connected—that 
allows for the most horrific violence to occur.  
Our complex understanding of right and wrong is created by the systems we exist inside. 
More directly, it is created by what we have ourselves experienced. From within our own 
individual socialized experiences, there is often nothing that ​requires​ us to understand someone 
else’s experience of oppression. It is, in fact, easier not to understand. Sometimes—as was the 
case with Eichmann—being unable to imagine or understand is caused by being within a system 
that requires or hinges upon this imaginative lack.  
During Eichmann’s trial, Arendt witnesses the judges grappling to understand this 
complexity:  
Their case rested on the assumption that the defendant, like all “normal persons,” 
must have been aware of the nature of his criminal acts, and Eichmann was 
indeed normal insofar as he was “no exception within the Nazi regime.” However, 
under the conditions of the Third Reich only “exceptions” could be expected to 
act “normally.” This simple truth of the matter created a dilemma for the judges 
which they could neither resolve nor escape. (27)  
From where Eichman stood, the expectation was for him ​not​ to be able to sympathize with the 
people he was helping to murder. (To have sympathized with them would have made them 
people​ and to see them as ​people​ would have required some recognition of Eichmann’s own 
relation to them.) The expectation of the Nazi regime was that its members would recognize 
themselves as a dominant force powerful enough to completely overshadow the personhood of 
the Jewish people. Eichmann’s own position allowed him to reduce the lives of millions of 
Jewish people into objects for his disposal. He lived in a time and place that normalized such 
things. And for Eichmann, this context is essentially what makes evil possible, by making it 
ordinary or even by making it a duty, especially when duty is something to obey without 
question.  
Eichmann excused himself by resorting to notions of normality and duty. Acting out his 
duty was essentially all he knew. But taking care to see what one does not ​have​ to see is also a 




Denying relation, denying culpability, the inability to see fault: these give way to the 
normalization not just of violent acts, but of whole ideologies that are rooted in violence. James 
Baldwin writes:  
One can be, indeed one must strive to become, tough and philosophical 
concerning destruction and death, for this is what most of mankind has been best 
at since we have heard of man. (But remember: most of mankind is not all of 
mankind.) But it is not permissible that the authors of devastation should also be 
innocent. It is the innocence which constitutes the crime (5). 
Being inside a system that affords one the ability to commit violent acts without thinking about 
them does not excuse those acts’ occurrence, nor should it detract from the ethical problem at 
hand. But I do not have to look far to see that this is not the case. Often, permission to act 
includes permission not to look at the harm one’s actions have caused. When Baldwin says, “It is 
the innocence which constitutes the crime”, he is telling me that being ignorant of evil does not 
excuse evil. It is always adjacent to me. Hannah Arendt offers a different perspective on a similar 
idea:  
The attitude of the German people toward their own past, which all experts on the 
German question had puzzled over for fifteen years, could hardly have been more 
clearly demonstrated: they themselves did not much care one way or the other, 
and did not particularly mind the presence of murderers at large in the country 
because none of them were likely to commit murder of their own free will…(16). 
In post-war Germany, the presence of former Nazis in the German people’s daily lives 
was not a salient issue because it held little bearing on those daily lives. For these people, 
knowing that the murders occurred under a certain set of circumstances was enough to remove 
any concern about the violent nature of any one individual. This disposition puts a degree of 
separation between the actual moral implications of the acts and how they are perceived.  
Systems that allow violent acts to occur among sane people confuse and unhinge the 
ability of victims to grasp what is ethically “correct.” Baldwin writes to his nephew:  
The details and symbols of your life have been deliberately constructed to make you 
believe, what white people say about you. Please try to remember that what they believe, 
as well as what they do and cause you to endure, does not testify to your inferiority but to 
their inhumanity and fear (8). 
Structural racism, anti-semitism, and sexism are systems that require objectification. It is 
objectification or othering by a dominant subject of a subordinate one that perpetuates the ability 
of the system to exist. The ability of the dominant party to exact control over the “other” is fed in 
two ways. First, by reducing the other to the status of an object, the dominant party is in effect 
enhancing their own status as a subject. Refusing to see the other as equal to themselves, they 
lose the ability to view the situation as a conflict between two equal parties, further reducing the 
other. Second, by stripping the other of the freedom that the dominant subject possesses—by 





I was so confused by what happened to me as a child that I went nearly a decade unable 
to speak about it. For a very long time, I didn’t even understand what was confusing me. I 
identified my situation as a common narrative of bullying in a public school system. It was the 
kind of situation I had heard about in guidance classes, on the news, from parents and teachers. ​I 
was the victim of bullying and it wasn’t my fault. I had done the right thing by reporting it. It was 
terrible, it shouldn’t have happened, but it was taken care of now and I would be okay.​ Roll 
credits.  
In the context of the narrative I was being told by my parents and teachers—the narrative 
I was participating in telling—of “bullying”, the story was over. But over time, my inability to 
stop thinking about what had happened made me realize that perhaps my narrative had been 
insufficient.  
As I got older, it became easier for me to see how “bullying” serves as a blanket term to 
describe all kinds of violence. As a seventh grader, I could not understand the ways in which I 
had been conditioned to expect intimidation and violence from a boy. I could not recognize that 
my being a girl made me an easy target for this boy’s abuse. I could not see that the ways my 
teacher and parents responded to the incident were informed by my gender. I could not see that I 
existed inside a system that safeguarded my welfare as a ​girl​. The artifacts from the court case 
that I found in my father’s file cabinet tell a gendered story. They tell the story of being a female 
inside a structure where fathers are supposed to protect their daughters. If this kind of protection 
means something completely different today than it did one hundred years ago, something less 
linked to property and more closely linked to love, I cannot overlook the fact that I exist inside a 
structure where fathers have to protect the safety and wellbeing of their daughters because men 
have been socialized in a way that allows them to inflict harm on women. One thing I have come 
to see is that my narrative is deeply informed by my being a girl.  
 
And what?  
And what?  
And ​then​ what?  
 
My narrative is deeply informed by my being a ​white​ girl. The one key factor in my story 
that I had convinced myself was irrelevant is perhaps the most relevant piece in understanding 
what was happening. ​He is black; I am white. ​The artifacts in my father’s file cabinet tell a story 
informed by gender ​and ​race. It took me until my senior year of college to be able to verbalize 
the importance of this key fact. Nobody brought race into the conversation at the time the 
incident occurred, although it remained a factor. Not my white parents, not my white teachers or 
the white administrators of my school. Nobody wanted to go near it, and so we pretended it 
wasn’t a factor at all, much the same way I had pretended that my gender wasn’t a factor. The 
story became a story of an incident of bullying between two children, something that could have 
happened to anyone. ​These acts could have been committed by anyone​. This is true, but it doesn’t 
tell the full story. Because when I come right down to it, the facts of what happened tell a 
specific story. Or they tell multiple stories at the same time. By ignoring these facts, I was 
denying myself the ability to see and understand what the complexity of the narrative was.  
 
In fourth grade, when this boy realized that I was going to tell our teacher that he had 
thrown a basketball in my face, he felt threatened by ​me​. As much as I would like to 
believe—have in the past believed—that this was not the case, the facts of what happened ​are 
linked to the history of white femininity in this country, and the reaction of my teachers and 
parents to what happened to me were informed by structural racism. They were informed by a 
structure in which my subject position held power over his. He felt threatened by me in a 
completely different way than I felt threatened by what he had done. We were both afraid, and 
each of us unable to see where the other person’s fear came from. As fourth-graders, the 
structures that we existed inside which caused me to fear him as a boy, caused the white teachers 
at my school to fear the problematic behavior of him as a black boy, and for him to fear me as a 
white girl were unrecognizable to me, and yet they existed. These structures deeply informed our 
individual reactions. My inability to understand this plagued me for years.  
When I was unable to see how my story was so deeply tied to a narrative of structural 
racism, I was inadvertently participating in the perpetuation of that structure. My consternation 
and fear over thinking about my story in this context came from a place of not being able to face 
what this story might be saying. James Baldwin says to his nephew, “We cannot be free until 
they are free”. The trauma of what happened to me followed me for so long because of my 
ignorance as a white person and inability to understand all sides of what happened. As long as I 
ignored what was happening, I could not come to terms with my own complicity and I could not 
learn to imagine what this other person might have felt or experienced. Ignorance is comfortable.  
What stopped me from realizing my effect on my classmate? What stopped me from 
understanding his fear? What allowed me to believe that I was the sole victim? How else might I 

















II: Interlude: A Letter to my Teachers 
 
 
“I will do this phenomenon ill, but that will do me good— 
if only because it will make me feel my incapacity to say it,  
just as it will make me take note of my own powerlessness to  
make it. I will therefore say I at my own risk and peril.  
But, dear reader, know this: I will say I in your name.” 
—Jean-Luc Marion, ​The Erotic Phenomenon 
 
 
At the beginning of this one of you asked me, “What do you already know about fear?”  
As it turned out the answer to this question was ​a lot less than I know now​. The conversations 
that the three of us have had over the past year have taught me a lot about my relationship to 
context. I think about context almost obsessively. I don’t want to begin without it. I can’t say ​this 
without first knowing enough about ​that​. This is the kind of learner I have always been. I am 
cautious. I am afraid. I am afraid to begin. I am afraid to speak. I am afraid to speak wrongly.  
My first attempt at not-beginning was by not putting myself inside of the work. The writing was 
going to be an observation. A consideration from the outside. I laughed when one of you gave 
me a sticky note with the pronoun “I” circled in dark ink. I laughed, but I brought it home and 
hung it on my bedroom wall—right next to the sticky note where I have written: “That is not 
what I meant at all; / That is not it, at all.”—and I considered it for the entire semester. “I” brings 
responsibility. Responsibility, I thought, would demand context. If this is going to be my voice, 
my ​word​, will I ever have enough context to begin? The answer, I think, is no.  
As my teachers, you have given me so many places to begin. For the first semester of my final 
year at college, when this project was just beginning, I slogged into the Creative Writing House 
every Friday morning, with a backpack full of your books, and the three of us crowded around 
the little desk in the second floor office.  
“I’ve just sent something downstairs to the copier for you,” one of you would say, 
probably smiling impishly. At first, I thought I might never finish this work, because by the time 
I finished your suggested reading alone, it would be time for graduation. What I realize now is 
that you understood my fear of this project being impossible and wanted to assure me of all the 
ways it was, in fact, completely possible. Not just one way, one approach, one definite path to 
knowing. Instead, many. In giving me Arendt, Woolf, Foucault, Baldwin, Hegel and all the rest, 
you were giving me permission to start anywhere, in any way I could. I began to learn that 
context can only take a person so far.  
The gathering of context does not end when I begin. Writing is part of the process of 
developing a thought. To write and record where I am right now in my understanding of the 
world, of fear, of violence, is just to record one particular truthful moment.  
Another important professor said to me once, “my entire pedagogy is based on making a 
fool of myself in public.” I know that to some degree, my life as a writer has to embrace a similar 
idea. The desire for context comes from a deep place of not wanting to get it wrong. What if I am 
misguided? What if my words fall short of their intended meaning? What if I have been 
irresponsible and insulting? I wasted a lot of time—precious and irreplaceable hours of my 
waning undergraduate education—afraid to begin. I began to realize that my need for context, 
despite having come from a conscious and responsible place, had turned insidious. From talking 
to the two of you (and reading your work), from the long days spent gathered around the table 
with our cups of tea and our writing, I have learned how to hold not-knowing, and how to 
converse with not-knowing, and how to prevent not-knowing from turning into ​never​ knowing. 
Now I endeavor to be the kind of writer who does not write as a result of ​having​ thought, but 




I must also consider my position.  
It occurs to me that, when considering what I already know about fear, I do not have very 
far to look. Already inside this project I have undertaken, this project of research, of 
contemplation, of attempts, I have uncovered something about fear. From the very beginning, 
what I wanted to know was ​why​. Why do we commit violent acts? Of all the possible ways for 
humans to behave, why ​this​ way? But now even more than ​why​, my question is ​how​. 
Undertaking this research  has brought me closer to an answer, but in a different manner than I 
had expected. 
I wanted to know how we let soldiers kill people. I wanted to know who I was talking 
about when I said—when I say—“we”. I began researching what I thought might get me closer 
to an answer. I read books, visited museums, timidly talked to people about my ideas. One 
person asked me if I was going to interview soldiers and talk to them about their experiences. 
The idea of doing this nearly turned me off the project completely. It seemed like a fair question. 
Wouldn’t this project, so concerned with the military and its moral ramifications, be utterly 
incomplete without this kind of research? But the thought of sitting down with someone, trying 
to understand their story made me shrink back. I feared that my position as a young middle class 
female college student trying to push a pacifist agenda with little life experience or philosophy to 
back it up would immediately put people, especially people involved in military life, on the 
offensive. I am timid. I didn’t want my project to insult anyone. I don’t like insulting people. But 
still my questions waited for me. Why? How? In my mind these felt like questions worth asking. 
Fair to ask, even. Still, every time I tried to voice them out loud to someone, I became unsure. I 
am still unsure. 
Figuring out how to approach this project, in many ways, has given me a way to 
understand what I set out to find. There are ways in which my position makes me feel as if I do 
not have authority to speak on this topic. As if I cannot speak ​to​ it. In reality, though, my 
privilege puts me in a place where I ​can​ do this work. I can express these opinions with minor 
consequence. I am learning that there are contributing factors to everything, even this. 
I have a lot of memories of being a child and sitting alone at my dining room table with 
paper and paints in front of me while my dad watched TV in the next room. The will to create 
something was there in me, even then. I would dip my brush in the paint and start to make shapes 
on the page with no real plan for where it was going. Most of the time I would get frustrated by 
my inability to choose an object to paint, my inability to commit to painting something that 
might not be good. So I just made markings that weren’t intentionally abstract. I couldn’t even 
commit to the project of making something abstract because every mark was obviously imbued 
with the restraint of wanting it to be something else—something that it was not, or could not be. 




In the fall, we went to Harvard to do research. ​Just come with us, and see what you find. 
How do you look for something when you don’t know what you are looking for? How do you 
know what will be useful? I was disappointed to learn that in order to do archival research, you 
have to have a plan. I generally like to have a plan, but in my mind I already had one: Do not 
implicate yourself. Do not try to say something you don’t know how to say. It was months into 
my project; a draft already existed, and still the thought of finding an angle, a specific path 
through factual research, felt too daunting.  
I used the search tool on the Harvard Library website, randomly typing in terms that I 
thought might get me closer to something useful. ​Violence, war, military, gender​. One of you 
suggested talking to one of the librarians about my project when I arrived, but this, too, felt 
impossible. How could I explain to a real person what I was doing, what I was looking for? I 
finally settled on requesting two boxes, at two different libraries, to be looked at over the course 
of two days. 
We were going to meet in Cambridge for the weekend. The two of you had your own 
work to do. We had been supporting each other in our individual projects, and if the research trip 
wasn’t something I would have indulged in alone, I was willing to go there in the spirit of our 
shared investment in each other’s work. Our plan was I would spend the first day on my own, 
and we would meet up later in the evening, then return to the archive the following day together.  
Driving down from Maine the evening before, trying to beat a blizzard that had been 
forecast, I wondered whether this whole thing was maybe just a waste of time. Of course the idea 
was exciting. Saying​ I’m going to Harvard to do research​ gives the illusion that you know what 
you’re doing. But as I drove down I-295 in the dark, I couldn’t help but feel like the entire 
weekend was a massive extravagance. Didn’t I have ​real​ work to be doing back in the 
fluorescent library in Farmington—the library full of students in L.L. Bean boots and 
sweatpants? Shouldn’t I be doing my work inside the shabby but safe confines of a place where I 
knew at least some kind of real work was possible? I should be spending these hours writing my 
term paper for Critical Theory, or catching up on one of the readings for Victorian Lit. What 
business did I have wasting an entire weekend doing fruitless, silly research in libraries with soft 
light and marble floors, among men in sports coats with briefcases, women with pearl necklaces 
looking through stacks and stacks of Important Documents, writing notes in brown leather 
notebooks? I felt like a fraud.  
The entire time I was in the reading room, I felt like an imposter. I felt as though at any 
moment someone was going to figure out that I had no idea what I was doing and the shame I 
privately felt would suddenly become public. I worried that one of the severe archivists would 
happen to ask me, as they brought out the materials I had requested in cardboard file boxes, what 
exactly​ I was researching. ​Why​ did I need to look through 12 boxes of autographed photos of 
military leaders? Was there some photo in particular I wanted to see? Which box did I want to 
look at first? ​Why? Why? Why are ​you​ here? 
I didn’t realize until I reflected on the experience with the two of you later that my reason 
for feeling these things was getting toward exactly what I had been wanting to think about all 
along. ​What do I know about fear?​ How information is disseminated, how the academic world is 
set up, how the systems of higher education have been developed, these things were all pressing 
on me as I sat in the library staring at my empty notebook page. I felt that this place was not for 
me. I felt that my ​project​ was not for me—not for my voice—and I was shrinking beneath that 
feeling.  
So, then, what? There are always things pressing against us. From the very first moment I 
sat down in a creative writing class—no: from the very first time I put a pencil to a notebook and 
wrote something—there were expectations of what I should say. They were not just  pressing 
down on me from the outside, not just the oppressive weight of history acting on me, but they 
were coming from within me too. ​I​ had expectations of what I should say.  
We learn what is expected of us by watching the world, and if we watch with even 
remote attentiveness, we’ll find plenty of rules to follow and plenty of reasons why the rules 
shouldn’t be broken. Listening to the rules is something I have been good at. I have never been 
the type of writer or artist—or even human being—who feels a need to break them. At one time 
in my life, this was something I was proud of. Lately, it makes me feel like a coward.  
What is pressing against ​me​? Me ​specifically​. You have both been asking me to think 
about where I am writing from. You have been asking me to think about my education; what it is 
and is not, what it has and has not been, what it should not be and what it could be, what I want it 
to be. Who is the dangerous work for? The daring work? Not much about where I come from, 
about what I have learned, has told me that this work is for ​me​. Nobody has ever explicitly told 
me that I cannot do this kind of work—the kind of work that would take me to Harvard to do 
research that might go nowhere—but I find I am always running up against the expectation of 
normalcy​, of​ rule-following​, of ​good enough​, of ​good enough for most of us.  
I wonder what I am talking about when I say “this kind of work”. What work do I desire 
to do? I cannot name it. I cannot see beyond what I know, I can only sense it. Even from within 
my education as an artist, I am taught that it is okay to conform. I am reading writers who have 
conformed deeply to the traditions of classic literature, thinkers who exist inside something 
which I fear cannot be dismantled and from which I cannot escape. The English language, the 
very element of my craft—the language I have built my life in devotion to—is itself an 
oppressive form.  
I have been taught that if I want to break the rules, I have to break them in the correct 
way:there have already been rule-breakers, and now rule-breaking itself is a tradition. I cannot 
point to one specific part of my education that has caused me to develop such an attachment to 
the rules. I think it comes back to my need for context. When I ask for context, in a way I am 
responding to a deep need to understand ​how things are done​. I want to know how things are 
done so I can know what to do and how to avoid transgression I do believe that it is difficult to 
know what is possible for me to do without seeing what others have done, but I see the ways in 
which my education has facilitated the limiting quality that context has over my work. Perhaps 




I live in a place that does not make clear to me what our responsibility is to one another 
when it comes to living as artists and writers—when it comes to living a creative life. Within our 
university in rural Maine, I am a part of a small community of artists, but it becomes unclear how 
to sustain that community when I leave this place (where my creative work at least has some 
currency). How will I carry on after that is gone, after ​I​ am gone? What will my relationship to 
my work be when I no longer have a designated space in which this type of thought is at home?  
Outside of the university—even from within it—I get the sense that making a space for 
your creative work can be a long and lonely road to walk. I have felt a lack of community in my 
creative life. It feels to me that imagination is a possibility for everyone, not just those who call 
themselves artists. But for young people in Maine, committing yourself to a creative life feels 
like a leap of faith. When I told people I was going to study creative writing in college, most 
were skeptical of my ability to make a return on that investment. When life has always been 
about struggling to make ends meet for nearly everyone around you, the project of making 
money, of finding a career, of not wasting your time feels like the only possible way to walk 
through the world.  
Recently, I wonder what danger there might be in this split I perceive between creativity 
and practicality. I fear that what is really happening when I treat creative life as frivolous and 
risky is that I create a dichotomy between ​creativity​ and ​life​. It is from deep within that 
distinction that I have felt the most powerless in my work. Where does this need to be practical 
come from? The word literally means “relating to practice or action, as opposed to speculation or 
theory” (OED).  
Considering that word gets me very close to what I have been thinking about from the 
beginning. In fact, it all seems to be right there inside that word. Action without theory. Action 
almost without ​thought​. Is that what we are committing to when we condemn imagination as 
frivolous? Imagination is an impulse through which we learn to think and through which we 
learn to feel. It is a possibility in any life. What I felt pressing against me when I undertook this 
project was the space inside a large cavern already mapped for me, into which I am not required 
to say anything, and into which I can walk in invisible subsistence for the rest of my life. The 
cavern of practicality, of not allowing myself to feel what is difficult to feel.  
As I write, I become more and more anxious over what the expense of this kind of 
creative fear might be. In my fear, I have essentially been denying myself the ability to think 
critically about something that I need to understand. What happens when I halt this kind of 
creative process? What am I not considering because I am afraid and because I feel bound to 
what I already know? Sometimes I am afraid to admit that I think something until I know that 
someone else thinks it too. But what happens when there is nobody to do the thinking for me? If 
I am too afraid to ask the questions that I need to find answers to, who will ask them? And will I 
feel satisfied with the answers? I worry that through my fear and shame, I am losing my ability 
to think, not just with authenticity, but with responsibility and awareness for how I comport 
myself in this world that is so public and so shared.  
In the archive at Harvard I was afraid, but I was not powerless. I did my research. I didn’t 
stop writing, because I knew that despite my fear there were two people sitting across the table 
who would hold with me every moment of not-knowing. It is because of this, because of the way 
that you, my teachers and companions in bewilderment, have shown me on a rather molecular 
level what it means to be responsible for one another creatively and ethically that I have begun to 
feel like there is a possibility for seeing past the fear I feel in speaking. No time to waste, 






















III. Thinking Towards Freedom 
 
First, I thought two things at the same time. ​Soldiers are good. War is bad. ​The military 
had always been there. A fact. One that I had, perhaps, the capability to accept or oppose. People 
say that we are free to act how we choose. We are free to speak, think, feel, love. ​We live in a 
free country.​ I am capable of accepting the military. I am capable of opposing it. I am capable of 
never addressing the fact that I have a choice, never choosing, never choosing a side. I am 
beginning to think that that capability and freedom are not synonymous.  
I didn’t think much about violence in high school, although I thought I was thinking a lot 
about it. I cared about the world and I cared vaguely about “social justice”. I wanted the world to 
be a more peaceful place. But I didn’t understand then that to care about something in earnest 
requires action. At the time, and for a long time since, I viewed the world as something 
impossible for me to change. 
I didn’t think much about the military in high school either, at least not until I had to. At 
the end of high school, my then-boyfriend joined the Army and I was overwhelmed by the need 
to decide my own ethical position regarding war. I had been taught to “respect the troops”.  I had 
also been taught that war was bad, that violence was bad. War was something I felt a vague sense 
of ambivalence toward. Reflecting on this now, my formative education in both ethics and 
patriotism feels bereft of meaning. I am opposed to war, but I was raised by my family and the 
community I live in to support the military. It is still a deeply personal question for me. I will 
admit, I am afraid to reveal that I have hesitations about the military. To say anything other than 
that I have “the utmost respect for the military” feels blasphemous. I have observed in my 
everyday life that people often preface their opinions about the military this way. ​I have the 
utmost respect for the military, but I don’t condone killing civilians​. ​I have the utmost respect for 
the military, but I don’t think the government should be spending so much money on  military 
and weapons technology​. To me, using this preface feels like something that grows from fear. I 






Lately I have been asking questions that, for a long time, I didn’t think there were 
answers to. I used to ignore these questions. Perhaps I don’t have a way to solve any of the moral 
or ethical problems I have with the military, but I realize now that I can begin to understand how 
we have gotten to this point, how these are the ethics we have agreed on in this country where I 
am a citizen. I am trying harder to think in this way, to be able to look closely enough at one 
thing that I can ask what else it might mean.  
There is no way for me to understand my hesitations around violence and the ways in 
which I am complicit in violence unless I can teach myself to find answers in things that do not 
look like they will provide answers. In his essay “Technologies of the Self,” Michel Foucault 
identifies a link between sexuality and secrecy. My question right now is not about sexuality, but 
I think it ​is​ about secrecy. Foucault explains his “study of the link between the obligation to tell 
the truth and the prohibitions weighing on sexuality” (2000, 224). Social prohibitions weigh on 
me when I try to think about the military. When I think about the military, I feel prohibited from 
expressing my opinion; speaking. I feel this because I know that people around me consider the 
military an untouchable subject, and that their reverence might make me seem ignorant for 
questioning it. The prohibitions I feel pull me between two different loyalties: to the community 
from whom I learned that the military deserves my utmost respect, and to my inner sense that 
war is morally wrong. When I feel as though I am prohibited from speaking my opinions, I begin 




I want to understand who is complicit in each act of violence, and in order to do that I 
have to think about how these acts are differentiated from one another. We have different words 
for acts of violence that take place within the military. Sometimes we call them acts of courage, 
or heroism. Closer to home, I was taught to recognize from a young age that certain acts of 
violence—and I am thinking of violence as one party intentionally damaging another party 
through emotional force, speech, physical assault, or death—are permissible under certain 
circumstances. At times I have wondered whether it is ridiculous to think that every act of 
violence is wrong, no matter the intention. I always assume there is more to any situation than I 
can understand, so I hesitate to develop lasting judgements of things. Putting this into words 
feels wrong to me, though, because I was ​also​ taught that violence is wrong. This suggests to me 
that my definition of what constitutes violence has been too narrow; it cannot be sustained in this 
tension I feel between violence as something that is sometimes permitted and violence as 
something that is never permitted. 
In “Technologies of the Self”, Foucault goes on to ask how “the subject [had] been 
compelled to decipher himself in regard to what was forbidden” (2000, 224). From where I am 
now, the conclusion that I draw when I think back to my high school self is that in order to think 
what I thought, I had to have not been thinking very deeply about anything that I believed in. 
This is probably true, but Foucault tells me that it might not be as simple as that. “How have 
certain kinds of interdictions required the price of certain kinds of knowledge about oneself?” he 
asks. “What must one know about oneself in order to be willing to renounce anything?” (2000, 
224). My high school self may not have been thinking about her ethical position on the military, 
but I think the reason for that goes beyond the fact that nothing was forcing me to think about it 
at the time. I did not even learn how difficult it would be to question a structure like the military 
until I was faced with the need to do so. I did not try to question it because I was afraid. What if 
my relationship to knowledge had not been defined by fear so early on? Would I have been able 
to begin thinking about and questioning the military if I did not have such a profound fear of 
being misinterpreted?  
How had I, as Foucault might ask, been compelled to decipher myself in regard to what 
was forbidden to me—namely this kind of inquiry? The more I think about it, the more I realize 
that my fear has not been of misinterpretation, but of disloyalty. When the question of my 
feelings toward violence in the military became a personal one, I felt a profound sense of 
self-consciousness in trying to name it. It was loyalty—to my boyfriend, to my family, to my 
community, to my upbringing, to my country—that told me not to question what happens when 
soldiers go to war. ​Soldiers are sacrificing their lives so we, the American people, can be free, 
people say to me, but I find I do not yet understand what any of those words—sacrifice, life, 




At the time that my boyfriend joined the Army I thought my biggest question was 
figuring out how I felt. What troubled me so much about him joining was not that he was going 
to go kill people, but that I thought he was going to die. I could only see myself in my question. 
My immediate reaction  was that​ I did not want him to die​. This was the first emotional response 
I had. I did not think of it as a question of ethics. I was only thinking about his life, not any other 
life claimed or saved by war. As time went on I began to realize that perhaps what was so 
disturbing to me about war was not that the person I loved was at risk of death, but that he could 
elect to be in that position, that the government would hire someone to fill the role of being both 
killer and killable. I was faced with a need to find my moral stance on war itself, not just come to 
terms with the prospect of someone close to me being in danger.  
Through the months when my relationship disintegrated, my questions about violence 
remained. All the way up until the moment of writing this, I have wondered whether a world 
without a military is even possible. According to the CIA, there are 36 countries that do not have 
standing militaries, the majority of which are small island nations. That is just shy of 20% of the 
world’s countries. It is possible for a country to exist in this way. That America defines itself by 
its strong military and militaristic foreign policy does not convince me of the ​need​ to define 
ourselves this way. It does not convince me of the necessity of disregarding my ethical questions 
in favor of being a patriot.  
I have found that the perception of criticism of the military as constituting an egregious 
lapse in one’s values complicates the difference between the military as an institution, and the 
individuals that make up its parts. Patriotic rhetoric forefronts the personal. The military as a 
perceived good is defined by ​individual​ sacrifice, by ​personal​ acts of heroism on the part of 
fellow Americans​. In this way, it becomes difficult to look at the structure as a whole without 
first seeing the individuals involved. It is for this reason that I have been afraid to ask questions 
about violence as they pertain to that structure and to the individuals within it. I have been afraid 
even to use the word ‘violence’ to describe certain actions when I am speaking to others. But 
when privately and secretly considering who has the right to kill and who can be killed, I am 
much less afraid to identify what I believe to be morally correct.  
In his book ​What Have We Done​, journalist David Wood explains the way in which the 
moral codes we live by in our normal lives change during times of war. He writes that  
[…] war is an alternate moral universe where many of the rules and values we 
grew up with are revoked. Do unto others, suspended. An alien world in which 
complex moral puzzles, like confronting a child combatant, demand instant 
decisions by those who are least fit to make them, for reasons of incomplete 
neurological development and life experience (11). 
What Wood captures in this passage is the complete ethical confusion a soldier is faced with 
when in battle. It is a confusion I will only ever be peripherally acquainted with, but even the 
distress I feel in my position so far outside of the military has been enough to drive me in 
undertaking this inquiry. Wood’s words help me understand how much heavier this 
weight—which I am struggling to carry in these pages— is for the people who experience battle.  
However, I find that I disagree with Wood when he says that war is “an alternate moral 
universe”. I understand the idea that circumstance changes what an action means, but I tend to 
think of this as more of a problem than a reason or justification. I feel compelled to echo a 
statement I made at the beginning of this work: war is not an alternate moral universe. War 
happens in the same universe where I live, the one where I have been taught to understand that 
killing is wrong, that violence against a fellow human being is extremely difficult to justify by 
circumstance. 
 That rules change in battle—that what constitutes a good moral life seems largely to 
depend on the laws that permit or forbid certain actions—causes me to question the power I give 
these laws to provide me with a correct way to be a moral individual. For some people, the fact 
that these moral “rules” change in battle adjusts the circumstances such that the acts of violence 
being carried out really do transform into something acceptable. I have to wonder though if the 
fact that these acts have the ability to be transformed in such a way in our minds can make them 
all the more threatening. I wonder whether this collective moral relativizing is what allowed me, 
at one point in my life, to wholeheartedly deny ​any other possibility​ for how a country, a 
populace, a government, a community, a ​person​ could be.  
And what if this ​is​ the case? I often feel overwhelmed by my inability to see what forces 
are acting on a situation and what structures have formed it. And speaking is another question 
than seeing. Even if I truly believe that killing is always wrong, that war is never the right 
solution to resolving conflict, that we should not trust solely in laws to teach us what is right and 





I recently moved into an apartment after having lived in dorm buildings for three years. 
Sitting at my dining room table one night, a friend asked me to think about why I liked living in 
that space more than I liked living in the dorm. 
“Because I can arrange everything the way I want now,” I answered. “I have more space 
to move things around.” We had been talking about conversation in writing, about being aware 
of the limits of our own voices.  
“Right,” my friend said, “and I don’t think that is completely ingermane to your writing. 
Sometimes we need to make our space bigger.” 
When I first started thinking seriously about violence, it was in direct response to my 
need to figure out where I stood on a question that felt very close to home. My boyfriend might 
die. He might kill other people. What do I know is right? What will I believe? What will I 
accept? I still think these are important questions, but I wonder more about my need to ask them. 
My consideration of violence has been rooted in what I have personally experienced, because 
this is how I have been taught to understand the world. It is natural that our experiences teach us 
things, but I think it’s possible that I have been trying too hard to find answers to my questions 
based on my experiences alone.  
What I know now—more than anything—is how much I don’t know. My need to keep 
bringing that phrase back tells me something about the way we deal with knowledge and with 
education in this world. It strikes me that the more I learn, the more I feel the weight of what I 
don’t know pressing down on me. It feels to me that once you pass a certain point in your 
education, everything you don’t know becomes more important than what you do know. But 
Foucault tells me that we “find it difficult to base rigorous morality and austere principles on the 
precept that we should give more care to ourselves than to anything else in the world”. He 
reasons that we “are more inclined to see taking care of ourselves as an immorality, as a means 
of escape from all possible rules” (2000, 228). The idea that secrecy, a characteristic of fear, 
guides my inability to understand myself (and thus the world around me) tells me that the ability 
to think freely without the limitation of fear is essential to being able to decode systems of 
power. Foucault writes that, “in theoretical philosophy from Descartes to Husserl, knowledge of 
the self (the thinking subject) takes on an ever-increasing importance as the first step in the 
theory of knowledge” (2000, 228). Foucault explains that to care for the “self” is different than 
caring for the body. He says the “self is not clothing, tools, or possessions; it is to be found in the 
principle that uses these tools, a principle not of the body but of the soul. You have to worry 
about your soul—that is the principal activity of caring for yourself” (2000, 230). Through caring 
for our souls we become better able to decipher what we believe. Through my own secrecy 
regarding my feelings of unease toward the military, I have denied myself the ability to form 
truthful knowledge about it, and other things, without giving in to the complication of fear.  
When I began this project, I thought that I only had my own experiences to guide me. 
What I already knew about violence, about fear, about shame—and what I wanted to know: all of 
these things formed the basis of my desire and my need to do this work. My fear in speaking has 
been deeply formed by the limitations of my own experience and the lack of freedom I feel in 
using my experience as a basis for knowledge. It is impractical to assume that my experiences 
alone are enough ground for answers. To learn to think about things in a way I would otherwise 
not have done—to imagine something different to my own experience—offers a different, 
complementary kind of knowledge. I can put these imaginative instances to work as a basis for 
further thought—and for further ​life​. 
My experience helps me understand one part of a story that can extend outward to 
infinity in every direction. But I have also learned that in order to understand just my own 
experiences of violence, my own experiences of fear, the small parts of my life that have touched 
the military, I need to make my space bigger.  
When I moved into my apartment this year, I suddenly had a very large space to fill, and I 
took great pleasure in trying to fill it. Among all of the books, posters, tea cups, records, and 
plants is the story of my understanding of myself and what it means for me to occupy a space. 
What I fill that space with helps me tell that story. When I wanted to tell the story of how I was 
hurt as child, I needed Hannah Arendt to help me understand how people thoughtlessly hurt each 
other. I needed James Baldwin to help me understand that I was not the only person who had 
been hurt, and why this was something I could not see. This is my story, but I cannot tell it alone.  
Foucault explains Plutarch’s belief that “we must learn to listen to ​logos​ throughout our 
adult life” (236).  ​Logos​ is an Ancient Greek word with many meanings, including ‘reason,’ 
‘word,’ ‘proportion,’ ‘principle,’ ‘order,’ or ‘logic.’ Foucault says that the “art of listening is 
crucial so that you can tell what is true and what is dissimulation, what is rhetorical truth and 
what is falsehood in the discourse of the rhetoricians” (2000, 236). The rhetoric we subscribe to 
(or that surrounds us) tells us certain stories about our world, about who we are and about what 
we should think and feel. Rhetoric gives ​logos​ a place. The rhetoric we use creates our ability to 
reflect on a situation and see it for what it is, not for the story we are being told about it. All my 
life I have listened to people in America talk about freedom. Lately I have begun to wonder what 
meaning that word has in a patriotic context, and also in a personal one. I have been accepting 




What am I free to do? It depends on how we define the word freedom. I don’t know 
whether that is something I can do alone. The last two lines of the U.S. Military Soldier’s Creed 
read, “I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life./I am an American Soldier.” The 
“American way of life” is something that, since the establishment of this country, has looked 
very different for everyone. This country is not free for everyone; it never has been. In the 
context of racial violence, of gender inequality, of economic injustice, the “American way of 
life” seems a rather brittle cause to stake one’s life upon. So why are so many of us willing to 
accept this rhetoric? How are we willing to accept freedom as central to our national identity 
when it so clearly is not available to everyone? Before the Army became an immediate part of 
my life, I did not have to question how I felt about it, so I didn’t. At eighteen I did not consider 
deeply the notion of freedom that is characteristic of American patriotic rhetoric. It also didn’t 
move me emotionally like it moved some of my peers. I do not understand the definition of 
freedom in America. I do not even understand the definition of freedom in my own life. 
I have a profound sense of the freedom I have experienced in my life as a white middle 
class cisgender female, but I have come to realize that the value of this freedom exists only in a 
structure designed to oppress people. But what if I am to think of freedom differently? James 
Baldwin tells me: 
[White people] are, in effect, still trapped in a history which they do not 
understand; and until they understand it, they cannot be released from it. They 
have had to believe for many years, and for innumerable reasons, that black men 
are inferior to white men. Many of them, indeed, know better, but, as you will 
discover, people find it very difficult to act on what they know (8-9). 
I have found it difficult to act on what ​I ​know. That difficulty is at its core a part of a deep 
feeling that I am not free to act in a certain way. What tells me that this is true? It is the very 
system which affords me power that prevents me from being able to see the ways that I should be 
questioning it. It ​is ​difficult to act on what I know, because I must first learn to see that I know it, 
and accept that I know it. I must accept what it means.  
I am still trying to understand what freedom means. I sense that it has many meanings of 
which I am yet unaware. To touch one another, to harm one another: we do not always 
understand that we are committing violent acts. We do not always understand these acts as 
wrong. I still do not know the answers to my questions about why we harm each other, but what 
I have begun to understand is how we do. The difficulty that Baldwin writes about is the 
difficulty of not understanding your place inside a system of power. Being unable to recognize 
occupying a place of power robs us of our ability to dismantle our position and the structure that 
upholds it. Baldwin tells me that it is an attachment to my power or my safety that makes it 
difficult for me to reflect on and understand my position. I have always wanted to be able to 
voice my opinion about the military. I have always wanted to feel safe in opposing it. It has been 
my choice, even when I didn’t think of it this way, not to act on those desires. In Baldwin’s 



















“But I must admit that I have had to follow  
the motifs, at least, of my first attempts, as far as the  
topical heart of the matter is concerned” 
-​On Touching—Jean-Luc Nancy, ​Jacques Derrida 
 
I would ask, at the end of this writing, for the reader to refrain from understanding the 
above work in the context of a search for a narrative conclusion. What I have written, read, 
researched, learned, and accomplished over the course of one calendar year marks only an 
opening. I have been able to write only from what I know and from what I have come across in 
my research. The writers I have thought with in these pages have formed the basis of my 
understanding of how to verbalize and give names to acts of violence. There are surely many 
other ways in which I could open for myself this space of knowing. I think of the above text, 
more than anything, as an ongoing experiment in learning to think.  
As I continue with my writing and thinking about violence (whether that be through 
revision and expansion of this work or through new projects) I hope to strengthen my 
philosophical and critical background in the concepts introduced here. My project began with 
questions. It began with the need to find answers for issues weighing on my personal conscience. 
I have not been able to find answers in the way that I thought I would; I find instead that I have 
new questions that are stronger, more vivid, and more precise than the ones I began with. More 
than that, I have directions to point myself in, and companions to help me navigate.  
I have written here about being consumed by a need for context. I find as I consider how 
I might move forward from this writing that the context I have developed for myself through this 
project is a sufficient basis for where I am going. I have James Baldwin to help me think now, 
and I have Hannah Arendt; I have Virginia Woolf, Michel Foucault, Eula Biss, Jane Gallop, 
G.W.F. Hegel; I have my companions in bewilderment, my teachers, and their bright and critical 
writing and thinking about the world. I also have my own curiosity, and a newfound 
empowerment in following it. I have grown less concerned with trying to find answers and more 
concerned with asking questions, with making ​attempts​ at answering them. This is one way I am 
taking up Baldwin’s call for us to ​act​. The act of trying to understand and to question has opened 
itself up in my ability to ask more freely and with diminished fear. I am not free of fear, but I 
understand more than I did at the beginning what an impact fear can have on what I know about 
myself and about the world. In seeing this fear, in facing it, I have given myself the opportunity 
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